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As high-net worth individuals have increasingly viewed art as
a method of diversifying their portfolios, prices in the high-end
global art market have exploded in the past several years. At the
same time, investors have developed new methods for accessing
art’s liquidity, such as art lending services and exchanges. While
the changing character of art towards an asset class has opened
the door to new investment opportunities, it has also left the art
market particularly vulnerable to money laundering schemes.
Existing characteristics of the art market, including a lack of
uniform record-keeping standards among dealers and the
speculative nature of art, also make it hospitable to this crime. In
light of the art market’s vulnerability to money laundering, the
need for legislation specifically addressing the industry seems
clear. Yet, professional art intermediaries raise legitimate
concerns about the compliance burdens and loss of confidentiality
that accompany a regulatory scheme. This Note addresses the
existing tension between potential anti-money laundering
legislation and art dealers’ interests, and proposes regulatory
solutions to prevent money laundering through art without
disrupting the art market.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2014, the United States charged Philip Rivkin with
fraud in the sale of biodiesel credits producing more than
$29,000,000 in profit.1 In what was likely an attempt to conceal the
fraud, Rivkin purchased more than $18,000,000 worth of art, with
his illicit gains.2 His collection included high-value works such as
a photograph by Edward Weston worth $165,000 and a $675,000
Alfred Stieglitz photograph.3 U.S. authorities discovered the
works, which Rivkin had kept in storage in Houston, right before
he attempted to ship them to Spain.4 As the government began
seizing Rivkin’s photographs, he made no attempt to salvage them,
likely because he had already stored money in several other assets
abroad, and thus, saving the photographs “was not worth his time
or effort.”5
Rivkin’s failed plot to ship millions of dollars of art abroad is
just one example of money laundering, the process through which
a criminal cleanses the proceeds of a crime so they appear

1

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Houston Man Charged with Biofuels Fraud
Scheme (June 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/houston-man-charged-biofuelsfraud-scheme [https://perma.cc/Y29T-R2HH] [hereinafter Biofuels Fraud Scheme]. A
court later sentenced Rivkin to 121 months in prison for fraud under the Clean Air Act.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Houston Man Sentenced to More than 10 Years in
Prison for Biodiesel Fraud Scheme (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/houston-man-sentenced-more-10-years-prison-biodiesel-fraud-scheme [https://perma.cc
/Y72U-4Vff]. The government charged him with money laundering as well, although he
was not convicted on those charges. Biofuels Fraud Scheme, supra.
2
Mario Parker et al., The Fake Factory that Pumped Out Real Money, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (July 13, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-fake-biofuelfactory/ [https://perma.cc/HVG5-8WCJ] (citing Special Agent Lea Bauer); Press Release,
U.S. Att’y’s Office Dist. of N.J., Forfeiture of More than $15 Million Worth of Artwork
Sought by U.S. Attorney’s Office (Mar. 1, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr
/forfeiture-more-15m-worth-artwork-sought-us-attorney-s-office [https://perma.cc/8JS36242].
3
Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office Dist. of N.J., supra note 2.
4
Parker et al., supra note 2.
5
Id.
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legitimate to investigators and law enforcement.6 Historically,
money launderers have cleansed their illicit proceeds through a
series of wiring transactions involving a traditional financial
institution like a bank.7 However, since the enactment of the Bank
Secrecy Act (the “BSA”), which directly targets money laundering
through banks, launderers have increasingly turned to luxury
markets such as the real estate market to accomplish the same
task.8
As Rivkin’s case and others’ demonstrate, the modern art
market has also become particularly vulnerable to money
laundering. This vulnerability is due in part to the changing
character of art and the global art market.9 As high-net-worth
individuals increasingly turn to art as a method of diversifying
their portfolios and storing value in the long term, prices in the top
end of the art market have exploded,10 leading to record sales such
as Jean-Michel Basquiat’s painting, Untitled, for $110,000,000 at
Sotheby’s in New York.11 The movement towards investment in
art has also facilitated new methods for doing so, such as art
lending services, art exchanges, and art funds, that theoretically
increase investors’ ability to access art’s value.12 Yet, while the
price of art and investors’ ability to access its value have increased,

6

CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33315, MONEY LAUNDERING: AN
OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. § 1956 AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2017).
7
Hannah Purkey, Note, The Art of Money Laundering, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 111, 115
(2010); Money Laundering, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatfgafi.org/faq/moneylaundering [https://perma.cc/4D6W-DH47] (last visited Dec. 7, 2018).
8
Jeffrey R. Boles, Million Dollar Ghost Buildings: Dirty Money Flowing Through
Luxury Real Estate Markets, 45 REAL EST. L.J. 476, 486 (2017).
9
See infra Section I.D.1.
10
Alice Xiang, Comment, Unlocking the Potential of Art Investment Vehicles, 127
YALE L.J. 1698, 1700 (2018); ART & FINANCE REPORT 2017, DELOITTE 117 (2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/at/Documents/finance/art-and-financereport-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RK4-9ZH5].
11
Clare McAndrew, The Art Market, ART BASEL & UBS 104 (2018),
https://d2u3kfwd92fzu7.cloudfront.net/Art%20Basel%20and%20UBS_The%20Art%20
Market_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/82NA-G3UG].
12
See NOAH HOROWITZ, ART OF THE DEAL: CONTEMPORARY ART IN A GLOBAL
FINANCIAL MARKET 148 (2011); Monique Sofo, How to Monetize an Art Collection,
CHRISTIE’S
INT’L
REAL
EST.:
LUXURY
DEFINED
(May
10,
2017),
https://www.christiesrealestate.com/blog/how-to-monetize-an-art-collection
[https://perma.cc/7KXD-YW3F].
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so too has the money launderer’s ability to monetize art for
criminal ends.13 Unique characteristics of the art market also make
it hospitable to money laundering14: professional art intermediaries
do not maintain uniform standards for recordkeeping15 while the
subjectivity of art and a lack of a standardized pricing
methodology make its value somewhat speculative.16 Thus, the art
market provides valuable assets that a launderer can purchase
anonymously for an inflated price without raising government
suspicion.17
Despite these vulnerabilities, though, there is no existing
regulatory scheme that directly targets the use of art for money
laundering, and the art market maintains very little self-policing to
prevent it.18 One recent proposal for legislation against money
laundering in the art market, the Illicit Art and Antiquities
Trafficking Prevention Act, would amend the Bank Secrecy Act to
include “dealers in art or antiquities.”19 However, many art dealers
and the organizations that represent them have pushed against this
proposal and other regulations in the market because they threaten
to impose high burdens of compliance on dealers while ignoring
the legitimate reasons for maintaining privacy in art transactions.20
Dealers also question whether art should be regulated in the same
way as commodities with standardized valuations such as precious
metals or coins.21 Yet, addressing money laundering is essential to
the proper functioning of the art market as this crime reflects a

13

See infra Section I.D.1.
See infra Sections I.D.2–I.D.3.
15
See Allyson Shea, Note, Shooting Fish in a Bliss Bucket: Targeting Money
Launderers in the Art Market, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 665, 671–72 (2018).
16
Id. at 672; HOROWITZ, supra note 12, at 170.
17
See infra Sections I.D.2–I.D.3.
18
See infra Section I.B.
19
Illicit Art and Antiquities Trafficking Prevention Act, H.R. 5886, 115th Cong. (§
2(a)(3) 2018).
20
Art Trade Reacts to Threatened Bank Secrecy Act, CULTURAL PROP. NEWS (June 25,
2018), https://culturalpropertynews.org/congressman-wants-bank-secrecy-act-to-regulateart-trade [https://perma.cc/2VVZ-TRFB].
21
See Zachary Small, Does the Art World Have a Money Laundering Problem?,
HYPERALLERGIC (Oct. 18, 2018), https://hyperallergic.com/465736/does-the-art-worldhave-a-money-laundering-problem [https://perma.cc/8VS4-T45T].
14
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complete disregard for artwork’s intangible aesthetic and cultural
values.
This Note explores the difficulties of imposing anti-money
laundering regulations in the United States art market. Part I
describes how the changing character of art, the unique culture of
the art market, and a lack of regulation of professional art
intermediaries have resulted in a vulnerable market. Part II lays out
the tensions between the government’s and art dealers’ interests in
regulating the market. Importantly, the same privacy that lends
itself to money laundering is also essential to art dealers’ ability to
attract and maintain clients. Part III proposes several regulatory
approaches that address the unique culture of the art market, as
well as a shift in art market practices towards more effective selfregulation.
I. MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH ART
IN THE MODERN ART MARKET
This Part describes how a rapidly expanding art market in the
United States without regulatory barriers has led to a booming yet
vulnerable market for money laundering. Section I.A provides an
overview of the federal criminal definition of money laundering
and the process of money laundering through art. Section I.B
describes the lack of existing anti-money laundering regulation
specifically targeted at the art market. Section I.C provides a brief
overview of the changing character of art as an alternative asset
and some of the ways investors have made art’s value more
accessible. Section I.D explains how high prices and new
investment methods, coupled with the unique characteristics of the
art market make it particularly vulnerable to money laundering.
A. Money Laundering Through Art Defined
The Money Laundering Control Act (the “MLCA”),22 the
federal statute that criminalizes money laundering in the United
States, defines four types of money laundering: promotional,

22

Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2012).
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concealment, structuring, and tax evasion.23 The most commonly
known and most relevant type for the purposes of this Note is
concealment, or the cleansing of illegal funds through a series of
financial transactions.24 A criminal must cleanse the proceeds of a
crime, because she cannot use them in the legitimate market, while
they still hold the “taint” of the underlying illegal acts, without
creating suspicion as to their origin.25 The MLCA defines this
process as engaging in or attempting to engage in a financial
transaction “knowing” it is designed to “conceal” the “nature,
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds”
of an “unlawful activity” and “knowing” that the property
represents the proceeds of such “unlawful activity.”26 Courts have
interpreted the use of the word “knowing” throughout section 1956
of the MLCA to include “willful blindness or conscious
avoidance.”27 Thus, a professional art intermediary could face
criminal liability under section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) for willfully
ignoring red flags suggesting her client is purchasing or selling a
work of art to conceal the proceeds of a crime even if she did not
have actual knowledge that her client was doing so.28
The process of cleansing illicit gains can become quite
complex depending on what method a criminal uses,29 but it
typically involves three basic stages: placement, layering, and
integration.30 In the placement stage, the first stage, the criminal
disentangles her illicit proceeds from their most obvious ties to the

23

DOYLE, supra note 6, at 2.
See id. at 10 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)).
25
Purkey, supra note 7, at 114–15.
26
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
27
DOYLE, supra note 6, at 3, 3 n.21 (quoting United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d
720, 725 (7th Cir. 1992)).
28
See id.
29
See, e.g., ABOUT THE NEED OF FORENSIC AND ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SERVICES
FOR ART MARKET PROFESSIONALS, DELOITTE 3 (2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/risk/lu-forensic-aml-art-market.pdf [https://perma.cc
/Z9HF-M3NM] (describing a process through which “a criminal organi[z]ation advises
an alternative investment fund to acquire a master piece for its art portfolio, and is
funding the purchase of the said piece via an art dealer located in a location where cash
settlement of auction sale is legal and common.”).
30
Purkey, supra note 7, at 115.
24
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underlying crime by introducing them into the financial system.31
The second stage, the layering stage, involves the movement of
funds to get rid of any remaining traces of the underlying crime.32
Finally, in the integration stage, the launderer can use the money,
now free of its illegal taint, in the legitimate economy.33 Art is
particularly vulnerable to money laundering in the placement and
layering stages,34 but it can also be used in the integration stage.35
For example, a money launderer might use her illicit cash to
purchase a piece of art in the placement stage.36 Then in the
layering stage, she might create a shell company to acquire
ownership of the art—thus further distancing her identity from the
original crime37—and then sell it.38 After selling the work, the
money launderer would be free to use the proceeds in the
legitimate economy.39 Alternatively, a money launderer might use
the placement stage to break up her illicit proceeds into smaller
amounts and then deposit these into a bank account.40 In the
layering stage, she might purchase investment instruments or
engage in a series of wiring transactions.41 Finally, in the
integration stage, the launderer would invest the legitimate funds in
luxury items, including artwork.42

31

Fabian Maximilian Johannes Teichmann, Twelve Methods of Money Laundering, 20
J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 130, 131 (2017); FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra
note 7.
32
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 7.
33
Id.
34
Teichmann, supra note 31, at 133–34 (finding that art may be suitable for the
placement and layering stages).
35
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 7.
36
Teichmann, supra note 31, at 133–34; Boles, supra note 8, at 480 (noting that a
criminal might purchase assets during the placement stage).
37
Monika Roth, Money Laundering and the Art Market, 11 JUSLETTER 6 (Jan. 11,
2016) (Ger.).
38
See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 7; see also Roth, supra note 37, at 6;
Boles, supra note 8, at 480 (explaining that a criminal might sell assets acquired during
the placement stage in the layering stage).
39
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 7.
40
See id., supra note 7.
41
Id.
42
Id.
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B. Barriers to Money Laundering Through Art in the United
States
The MLCA and the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (“BSA”)43 are
two pieces of legislation that act as substantial barriers to money
laundering in the United States.44 However, there is currently no
regulation that specifically targets money laundering in the art
market, nor does the art market itself subject professional art
intermediaries to any standards of professionalism that directly
address money laundering. This Section describes the existing
barriers to money laundering and the large gap that remains for
money laundering through art.
1. Government Oversight
The BSA is the first piece of legislation aimed at preventing
money laundering in the United States.45 Congress established the
BSA in 1970 to prevent criminals from using banks to cleanse their
illegal gains.46 The BSA authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury
to enforce certain anti-money laundering requirements for banks
and other nonbank businesses defined as “financial institutions.”47
Subsequent legislation expanded anti-money laundering
requirements under the BSA.48 First, the Annunzio-Wylie AntiMoney Laundering Act set requirements for financial institutions
to file Suspicious Activity Reports with the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”).49 Congress later enacted the

43

Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
44
See Boles, supra note 8, at 482–84.
45
Boles, supra note 8, at 482–83.
46
Michael J. Anderson & Tracy A. Anderson, Anti-Money Laundering: History and
Current Developments, 30 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 521, 523 (2015).
47
RENA S. MILLER & LIANA W. ROSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL44776, ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING: AN OVERVIEW FOR CONGRESS 5 (2017). The Secretary of Treasury
established the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), under the Secretary
of the Treasury, to administer the BSA. Id. at 14; Anderson & Anderson, supra note 46,
at 523. FinCEN is responsible for “issu[ing] guidance, advisories, and rules on BSA
implementation and maintain[ing] the federal government’s database on required
reporting by financial institutions and regulated industries, including suspicious activity
reports (SARs) and currency transaction reports (CTRs).” MILLER & ROSEN, supra, at 14.
48
MILLER & ROSEN, supra note 47, at 5, 10.
49
Boles, supra note 8, at 483.
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Patriot Act to combat terrorism financing.50 The Patriot Act
increased the compliance burden for “financial institutions” by
requiring that they establish at a minimum (1) the “development of
internal policies, procedures and controls; (2) designation of a
compliance officer; (3) an ongoing employee training program;
and (4) an independent audit function to test programs.”51
While the definition of “financial institutions” does not include
professional art intermediaries, the BSA does already apply to
them to some extent. For example, the Internal Revenue Service,
under the authority of the BSA, requires that anyone in a trade or
business who engages in a transaction or several related
transactions of more than $10,000 in cash submit a report to
FinCEN.52 As businesses, dealers in art or antiquities are required
to report such transactions under the BSA.53 However, because
professional intermediaries in the art market are not considered
financial institutions under the BSA, they do not have to comply
with its anti-money laundering standards or file suspicious activity
reports.54 Thus, art dealers have little incentive other than good
faith to flag possible money laundering schemes involving artwork
for law enforcement.55 Furthermore, prosecutors often discover
50

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and in other U.S. Code sections).
51
Boles, supra note 8, at 493. Section 352(c) of the Patriot Act also tasks the Secretary
of the Treasury with crafting anti-money laundering regulations that are “‘commensurate
with the size, location, and activities’ of the financial institutions to which such
regulations apply.” Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering
Programs for Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 70 Fed. Reg. 33702, 33703
(proposed June 9, 2005) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (citing USA PATRIOT Act
§ 352(c)).
52
Bank Secrecy Act, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/smallbusinesses-self-employed/bank-secrecy-act [https://perma.cc/37AQ-87P4] (last visited
Dec. 7, 2018); see also Anderson & Anderson, supra note 46, at 529–31.
53
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 52; see Patricia Cohen, Valuable as Art,
but Priceless as a Tool to Launder Money, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/arts/design/art-proves-attractive-refuge-for-moneylaunderers.html [https://perma.cc/ZVV2-VUB8].
54
See Zachary Small, Art Dealers Could be Under More Financial Scrutiny with New
US Bill, HYPERALLERGIC (June 25, 2018), https://hyperallergic.com/448705/banksecrecy-act-art-dealers-luke-messer [https://perma.cc/TF63-F5WR]; Cohen, supra
note 53.
55
See Cohen, supra note 53.
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money laundering schemes involving art through suspicious
banking activity or violations of customs laws rather than reports
of cash transactions over $10,000.56
2. Self-Regulation
The art market itself maintains little oversight of its
professionals in a way that would encourage them to help law
enforcement prevent money laundering through art.57 The national
professional trade organization for art dealers in the United States
is the Art Dealers Association of America (“ADAA”).58 While the
ADAA’s code of ethics generally requires that each member
“comply with all applicable laws and regulations,” it does not
maintain any ethical provisions pertaining to money laundering
through art specifically.59 There are several state organizations for
professional art dealers as well; however, these organizations have
similarly unspecific ethical guidelines for their members.60
Additionally, while the ADAA has 180 members, there are an
estimated 1500 art dealers in New York City alone.61 Furthermore,
dealers may join only by invitation from the ADAA’s board if they
“have an established reputation for honesty, integrity and
professionalism among their peers, and [] make a substantial
contribution to the cultural life of the community by offering
56

Id.
Jason-Louise Graham, Art Exchange? How the International Art Market Lacks a
Clear Regulatory Framework, in ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE MARKET 319, 337
(Valentine Vadi & H.E.G.S. Schneider eds., 2014) (citing Patty Gerstenblith) (“[T]he art
market is an active and vital segment of commercial transactions which require the
formulation of a flexible and realistic yet also adequate model for protection of those
consumers who do venture into that marketplace.”); see also Shea, supra note 15, at 673.
58
About, ART DEALERS ASS’N AMERICA, https://www.artdealers.org/about/mission
[https://perma.cc/4SF4-QJGF] (last visited Dec. 7, 2018).
59
Code of Ethics and Professional Practices, ART DEALERS ASS’N AMERICA,
https://www.artdealers.org/about/code-of-ethics-and-professional-practices
[https://perma.cc/Y85Y-TN2S] (last visited Dec. 7, 2018).
60
See,
e.g.,
Code
of
Ethics,
ART DEALERS ASS’N CALIFORNIA,
http://artdealersassociation.org/CodeOfEthics.html
[https://perma.cc/YQ3D-VWGF]
(requiring that dealers “[w]ork to protect the community against those who would engage
in unethical or illegal actions”) (last visited Dec. 7, 2018).
61
ART DEALERS ASS’N AMERICA, supra note 58 Howard Halle, Best Art Galleries in
New York City, TIMEOUT (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.timeout.com/newyork/art/bestart-galleries-in-new-york-city-galleries [https://perma.cc/7SYC-YUKE].
57
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works of high aesthetic quality, presenting worthwhile exhibitions
and publishing scholarly catalogues.”62 Finally, since dealers are
not required to join the ADAA to practice in the art trade, they
have practically no incentive to do so.63 Thus, with only a small
handful of members who are already conducting reputable
practices, the ADAA and state organizations do little to prevent the
use of art for money laundering.64
Auction houses are not subject to any oversight from within the
market either. However, several of the major auction houses in the
United States have their own anti-money laundering systems in
place.65 For example, Christie’s global compliance team manages
an anti-money laundering program, which includes staff training,
due diligence, and record-keeping.66 The auction house also limits
the amount of cash that a customer may use in the purchase of an
item and does not allow third parties to pay for a work.67 Sotheby’s
similarly restricts customers’ ability to pay through cash or a third
party.68 Its guidelines provide, “[y]ou can pay by bank transfer,
cheque or cash (subject to certain restrictions and legal limits).
Certain credit cards are accepted at particular Sotheby’s
locations . . . . Payment must be sent from the invoiced party and

62
ART DEALERS ASS’N AMERICA, supra note 58; see also Shea, supra note 15, at 673.
Similarly, the Art Dealers Association of California “carefully selects dealers committed
to the profession, dealers in fine art who have earned an outstanding reputation in their
communities for integrity and expert knowledge.” Qualifications for Membership, ART
DEALERS ASS’N CALIFORNIA, http://www.artdealersassociation.org/Qualifications.html
[https://perma.cc/FC24-WGZG] (last visited Dec. 7, 2018).
63
Shea, supra note 15, at 673 (noting that even well-known and reputable galleries
such as Gagosian are not members of the ADAA).
64
Id.
65
Eileen Kinsella, US Art Dealers May Soon be Subject to Government Financial
Regulation, ARTNET NEWS (May 2, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/us-artdealers-financial-regulation-1277351 [https://perma.cc/R85W-5L63]; see also, e.g.,
Compliance, SOTHEBY’S, https://www.sothebys.com/en/departments/compliance (last
visited Dec. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T9B9-LXPZ]; Selling at Christie’s, CHRISTIE’S,
https://www.christies.com/selling-services/selling-guide/financial-information
[https://perma.cc/LF4H-5378] (last visited Dec. 7, 2018).
66
CHRISTIE’S, supra note 65.
67
See id.
68
Shea, supra note 15, at 674 n.53 (citing Buy & Sell, SOTHEBY’S,
https://www.sothebys.com/en/buy-sell#buying-basics [https://perma.cc/56DG-ZSGN]).
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not from a third party.”69 However, without any oversight from the
government or the art market, it is not clear how effective these
individual anti-money laundering programs actually are.
C. The Modern Art Market
Understanding the threat of money laundering in the modern
art market requires an examination of the changing character of art.
In recent years, the price of art, particularly in the high-end of the
art market, has grown rapidly.70 This has brought attention not only
from wealthy collectors but also from a new class of investors71
that has developed new methods of increasing stability in the art
market.72 This section describes the various impetuses behind
massive growth in the high-end art market and provides two
examples of new strategies for accessing the monetary value of art.
1. The Rise of the Art Market
The global art market has seen significant growth over the past
several years.73 In 2017, sales in the art market totaled more than
63 billion dollars, up 12% from 56 billion dollars in 2016.74 Three
major auction houses, Sotheby’s, Christie’s, and Phillips, saw a
total increase in sales of 18% from 2016.75 One extreme example
of this growth is Christie’s sale of Leonardo DaVinci’s painting,
Salvatore Mundi for $450,000,000 in 2017, the most money ever
paid for a single piece of art.76 The United States is a key player in

69

See id.
Gaby Del Valle, Why is Art So Expensive?, VOX (Oct. 31, 2018, 1:50 PM),
https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/10/31/18048340/art-market-expensive-ai-painting
[https://perma.cc/EV5G-BBQ9].
71
See Graham, supra note 57, at 322.
72
See id. at 324.
73
See id. at 320.
74
McAndrew, supra note 11, at 15. The market saw two years of contraction in 2015
and 2016. 2017 Summary: The Art Market Enters a New Phase, ARTPRICE,
https://www.artprice.com/artprice-reports/the-art-market-in-2017/2017-summary-the-artmarket-enters-a-new-phase [https://perma.cc/5S4M-YYQ8] (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
75
DELOITTE, supra note 10, at 40.
76
Del Valle, supra note 70; see also Paul Melton, Art Market Histories of the 20th
Century, SOTHEBY’S INST. ART (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.sothebysinstitute.com/newsand-events/news/art-market-histories-of-the-20th-century
[https://perma.cc/2XASRSWR].
70
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this global art market, maintaining the largest portion of total sales
value of any country at 42%.77 The majority of this increase in
value can be attributed to works at the top end of the market.78
While sales by art dealers for less than $50,000 accounted for the
majority of dealer transactions in 2017, they represented only 30%
of the value of dealers’ total sales.79 The same is true in the auction
market, where artists whose works sold for more than $10,000,000
dominated the value of total sales, but accounted for only 0.2% of
sellers at auction.80
There are several forces behind this massive growth in highend transactions. First, the number of high-net-worth individuals—
investors who are often interested in purchasing luxury goods—has
increased in the last several years.81 Additionally, the art market
has become increasingly globalized as individuals from new
countries begin to participate more and more in high-end
transactions.82 Finally, the finance market has become increasingly
interested in art as an asset class.83 Particularly, since the financial
crisis in 2008, investors have sought out alternative assets, such as
art and other collectibles for stability.84 While many financial
experts are still skeptical about art’s ability to provide significant
returns in the long term,85 wealth managers are beginning to view

77

McAndrew, supra note 11, at 15.
Del Valle, supra note 70.
79
McAndrew, supra note 11, at 56. 74% of sales by professional intermediaries in
2017 were for less than $50,000. Id.
80
Id. at 122–23. “Just 25 artists accounted for nearly half of all contemporary auction
sales in the first six months of 2017.” Del Valle, supra note 70.
81
Kyle
Sommer,
The
Art
of
Investing
in
Art,
J.P. MORGAN,
https://www.jpmorgan.com/country/US/en/jpmorgan/is/thought/magazine/3Q2013/art
[https://perma.cc/XVV4-4H23] (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
82
See id. For example, individuals from China, Russia, and the Middle East have
increasingly taken part in transactions in the global art market. Id. Additionally, China
surpassed the United Kingdom for the second largest share of value in the global art
market in 2010, despite holding less than 5% of the market’s value in 2006. McAndrew,
supra note 11, at 34.
83
See generally DELOITTE, supra note 10.
84
Graham, supra note 57, at 322.
85
McAndrew, supra note 11, at 13. Global Chief Investment Officer of UBS, Mark
Haefele, explains that art does not provide some of the long term benefits that stocks and
bonds do, such as “dividends, coupons, and risk premia, and the opportunity to diversify,
rebalance, and liquidate.” Id.
78
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art as a new method of diversifying a portfolio.86 There are several
theoretical benefits to adding art to a wealth management offering.
First, art may have a low correlation with other asset classes, such
that it performs better than stocks and bonds during periods of
economic decline.87 Art can also be an effective way to store value
when the market faces a period of inflation.88 Finally, art prices
have tended to rise over long periods of time, thus offering at least
moderate returns as long-term investments.89
2. Accessing the Value of Art: Dealing with Illiquidity in the
Art Market
Despite its benefits as an alternative asset, art has several
inefficiencies that inhibit investment opportunities.90 One aspect of
art that is prohibitive to investment is its illiquidity.91 Collectibles
like art tend to be illiquid92 in part because purchasing and selling
them requires large transaction costs that offset their value.93
Unlike a sale of stock, a collector cannot sell his Picasso by simply
pushing a button.94 For example, it typically takes an auction house
three to six months after consignment to sell a piece of art.95
During this time, the owner will have to pay for storage of the
work, as well as its maintenance.96 These costs can significantly
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Xiang, supra note 10, at 1700; DELOITTE, supra note 10, at 36, 117 (finding that
48% of wealth managers surveyed stated that the best reason to include art in a portfolio
is for diversification and 88% said that art should be included as part of a wealth
management offering).
87
Xiang, supra note 10, at 1700.
88
Id. at 1700–01.
89
Sommer, supra note 81.
90
Adriano Picinati di Torcello, Why Should Art be Considered as an Asset Class?,
DELOITTE 20 (2010), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents
/financial-services/artandfinance/lu-art-asset-class-122012.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NLQCLQD].
91
Xiang, supra note 10, at 1713–15.
92
“Illiquid refers to the state of a security or other asset that cannot easily be sold or
exchanged for cash without a substantial loss in value.” Illiquid, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/illiquid.asp [https://perma.cc/3HWU-KFV7] (last
visited Dec. 7, 2018).
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Xiang, supra note 10, at 1710.
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HOROWITZ, supra note 12, at 170.
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Id.
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Xiang, supra note 10, at 1710.
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offset the value the owner of the work will receive in the sale.97
Additionally, art is unique and subject to trends and personal
tastes, which means there may not always be demand for a work in
the market, making it difficult for the investor to sell right away.98
Thus, illiquidity can be prohibitive to investors attempting to
access the monetary value of a work of art quickly. It is also
prohibitive to purchasers who cannot afford to commit significant
capital to an asset without knowing they will be able to sell it for
cash any time soon.99
Investors have used several methods to combat this illiquidity.
One way to avoid substantial transaction costs between the
acquisition and sale of a work of art is through the use of
freeports.100 As the art market has expanded in the past several
years, so too has the need for space to store one’s work.101
Freeports are tax-free and duty free storage spaces for art and other
collectibles.102 Investors often store a work of art to keep it out of
sight so that they can create greater demand for it by later
reintroducing it to the market as a “fresh” work.103 Freeports allow
the investor to store the work without incurring certain significant
costs during the period between purchase and sale.104 A second
method through which investors have combatted art’s illiquidity is

97

Id.
See Henri Neuendorf, Art Demystified: What Determines an Artwork’s Value?,
ARTNET NEWS (June 29, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/market/art-demystified-artworksvalue-533990 [https://perma.cc/FLY3-9TX2].
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Xiang, supra note 10, at 1702.
100
Katie L. Steiner, Dealing with Laundering in the Swiss Art Market: New Legislation
and its Threat to Honest Traders, 49 CASE WESTERN RESERVE J. INT’L L. 351, 359
(2017).
101
Eileen Kinsella, Amid a Booming Market, UOVO Plans to Open its Fourth Art
Storage Facility in Bushwick, Brooklyn’s Hipster Art Capital, ARTNET NEWS (Aug. 27,
2018),
https://news.artnet.com/market/uovo-bushwick-brooklyn-1337819
[https://
perma.cc/RH3W-9NKX]; see also, e.g., Eileen Kinsella, Inside the Uber-High-Tech Art
Warehouse That Doubles as New York’s First-Ever Freeport, ARTNET NEWS (May 2,
2018),
https://news.artnet.com/market/the-first-ever-freeport-in-new-york-is-a-superhigh-tech-art-warehouse-1275194 [https://perma.cc/SE3B-3VE9] [hereinafter Kinsella,
Uber-High-Tech Art Warehouse] (describing ARCIS, New York’s first, duty-free art
storage space).
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Steiner, supra note 1010.
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art lending services. Art lending allows an investor to quickly
access some of the value of a work of art, without bearing the costs
of selling it.105 Mostly specialized boutiques106 and auction
houses107 engage in art monetizing services;108 however, banks
sometimes outsource art management groups to offer art-based
loans.109 Art lending services include term loans, acquisition
financing, revolving lines of credit, dealer inventory financing,
bridging loans, and arranging loans to museums and exhibitions.110
A lender typically will offer 45% to 60% of the market value of the
work.111 Thus, art financing allows an art investor to use the value
of her art—without selling it—such that she can engage in other
investment opportunities.112 While freeports and art lending are not
necessarily new methods of accessing art’s value,113 they are
becoming increasingly accessible to investors.114
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Sofo, supra note 12.
See, e.g., Art Financing, ARTEMUS, http://www.artemus.com/sale-leaseback
[https://perma.cc/EV5T-U4HY] (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
107
See, e.g., Sotheby’s Financial Services, SOTHEBY’S, https://www.sothebys.com
/en/about/services/sothebys-financial-services
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visited Dec. 7, 2018).
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See Sofo, supra note 12.
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Graham, supra note 57, at 326 (noting that art lending existed almost thirty years
ago) (citing Skate’s art industry investment report of February 2013 at p. 22).
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See, e.g., Steiner, supra note 100, at 355 (noting the expansion of the Swiss Freeport
in 2014); Sofo, supra note 12 (noting that traditional banks would only lend against art
with the additional support of the client’s “financial assets or general creditworthiness,”
whereas Athena—a monetizing fund—has greater flexibility to lend primarily against a
collector’s art). In the last five years, art financing has grown 15% to 20% each year and
is now a $15,000,000,000 market in the United States. Katya Kazakina, Art of Shadow
Banking: How an Auction House Got into the Picture, WEALTH MGMT. (July 28, 2016),
https://www.wealthmanagement.com/high-net-worth/art-shadow-banking-how-auctionhouse-got-picture [https://perma.cc/E2JE-Y7PE] (citing ART & FINANCE REPORT 2016,
DELOITTE 117 (2016) https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/at/Documents
/finance/art-and-finance-report2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CXP-JKSJ]).
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D. The Potential for Money Laundering Through Art:
A Vulnerable Market
The lack of regulation of high-value transactions combined
with increasingly greater access to art’s value has left an art market
that is particularly vulnerable to money laundering.115
Additionally, several characteristics of art and art dealers’ practices
make it a particularly attractive laundering tool.116 Thus, while
there are no existing convictions for money laundering achieved
solely through the purchase and sale of art, and the extent of this
problem is not entirely clear,117 the potential certainly is. This
Section explores in depth the characteristics of the modern art
market that make it vulnerable to money laundering.
1. Art as an Asset
Rising prices and investment opportunities in the modern highend art market have made it vulnerable to money laundering for
several reasons.118 First, the high value of an individual work of art
is beneficial rather than prohibitive to money launderers.119 It is
much easier for a money launderer to cleanse her ill-gotten gains
through a transaction involving one expensive asset rather than
several transactions of less expensive goods.120 Additionally, a
money launderer has substantial capital, presumably from
partaking in illegal acts, to purchase a work of art and does not
have the “same economic rationale for transactions” as legitimate
investors.121 Thus, a high acquisition price is beneficial rather than
prohibitive to money launderers.122
Second, investors’ use of new tools to combat art’s illiquidity
have also fostered criminal activity. A recent example
demonstrates how a money launderer might take advantage of an
115

DELOITTE, supra note 29 at 3. “Booming economies might not yet be fully aware of
money laundering risks or equipped to identify money laundering schemes.” Id.
116
Teichmann, supra note 31, at 133–34.
117
See Small, supra note 21. Anti-money laundering expert John Byrne addressed the
lack of convictions, noting this did not prove the absence of the crime itself. Id.
118
DELOITTE, supra note 29, at 3.
119
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120
Id.
121
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122
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art monetizing fund.123 In November 2018, the United States
charged Low Taek Jho and other Malaysian officials with
conspiring to launder money embezzled from a Malaysian
investment fund.124 The government alleged that Low attempted to
launder money “through the U.S. financial system by purchasing,
among other things, luxury residential real estate in New York City
and elsewhere, and artwork from a New York-based auction house,
and by funding major Hollywood films.”125 The launderers
purchased paintings from Christie’s by Basquiat, Rothko, and Van
Gogh.126 Later, a Cayman Island Company, which Low wholly
owned, obtained a loan of $107,000,000 from Sotheby’s, using
several of the paintings purchased from Christie’s as collateral.127
Thus, art monetizing services enable money launderers, as well as
legitimate buyers, to access the value of a work.
2. Confidentiality in Transactions
A unique aspect of the art market is the anonymity involved in
transactions through professional intermediaries such as private
dealers and auction houses. Often, the buyer and seller in private
sales and public auctions do not know one another’s identities128
123

See Kazakina, supra note 114.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Malaysian Financier Low Taek Jho, Also
Known As “Jho Low,” and Former Banker Ng Chong Hwa, Also Known As “Roger Ng,”
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Hundreds of Millions of Dollars in Bribes (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/malaysian-financier-low-taek-jho-also-known-jho-low-and-former-banker-ngchong-hwa-also-known [https://perma.cc/B9AK-DWVD].
125
Id.
126
Graham Bowley & William K. Rashbaum, Has the Art Market Become an Unwitting
Partner in Crime?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19
/arts/design/has-the-art-market-become-an-unwitting-partner-in-crime.html
[https://perma.cc/G5P2-EE33].
127
Id. A former special prosecutor for the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Art Crime
Team explains that money launderers may choose to take advantage of art loans from
small boutiques or auction houses rather than large banks because “[t]he level of scrutiny
you’ll receive from a bank is much higher than you will receive from an auction house.”
See Kazakina, supra note 114 (internal quotations omitted). Before taking a loan from
Sotheby’s, Low had explained to his art dealer that he preferred “the boutique banks that
can move fast” as opposed to “the large ones like [J.P. Morgan].” See id.
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Cohen, supra note 53. “A painting might sell at a public auction for more than $100
million, and the identities of the seller, the guarantor, the external bidders and the final
buyer will remain cloaked in confidentiality.” Scott Reyburn, A Tug of War Over Art124
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and even large transactions are often conducted entirely through
cash.129 Art dealers do not maintain uniform recordkeeping
practices and often do not share information about their prior sales
with third parties.130 The ability of purchasers to transact
anonymously in the art market makes it difficult for authorities to
trace a money launderer to an underlying crime, especially if art
dealers have no incentive to report suspicious activity.131 A recent
case provides an example of how a money launderer could hide
behind a professional art intermediary to launder illicit gains
without detection. In March 2018, the United States charged
Matthew Green,132 an art dealer in the United Kingdom, with
conspiracy to hide $9,000,000 obtained through a securities fraud
scheme under section 1956(a)(3)(A)(ii) of the MLCA.133
According to the indictment, Green and three other individuals
proposed a plan to an undercover agent, posing as a member of the
money laundering conspiracy, for him to purchase a Picasso
painting titled Personnages from Green.134 The agent would
purchase the painting, estimated to be worth $4,000,000 to
$7,000,000 in 2010, using some of the proceeds from the securities
fraud.135 The agent would then keep the painting for an unspecified
amount of time until Green arranged to resell it, and Green would

Sales Transparency, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com
/2015/09/28/arts/international/a-tug-of-war-over-art-sales-transparency.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/Z3JN-7BDM].
129
Teichmann, supra note 31, at 134; DELOITTE, supra note 29, at 3.
130
Shea, supra note 15, at 671–72.
131
See Scott Reyburn, What the Panama Papers Reveal About the Art Market, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/arts/design/what-thepanama-papers-reveal-about-the-art-market.html [https://perma.cc/5VPW-PXGA].
132
Green’s father, Richard Green, is a well-known art dealer in London, and owns the
Richard Green Art Gallery. Eileen Kinsella, UK Art Dealer Matthew Green Charged in a
$9 Million Picasso Money-Laundering Scheme, ARTNET NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/matthew-green-charged-money-laundering-us-1236929
[https://perma.cc/8FJN-4NF4].
133
Superseding Indictment at 7, 26–27, United States v. Kyriacou, No. 18-102 (S-1)
(KAM) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2018). Section 1956(a)(3)(A) covers financial transaction
offenses where law enforcement pose as agents attempting to launder money, thus
tricking the suspected money launderer into conveying his plan. DOYLE, supra note 6, at
8.
134
Superseding Indictment, supra note 133, at 17–18.
135
Kinsella, supra note 132.
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then transfer the proceeds to the agent through a bank account in
the United States.136 One of the members of the conspiracy
explained to the agent that they had chosen to launder part of their
proceeds through art because the art market is “‘the only market
that is unregulated.’”137
Two other methods of investing in art also allow a buyer to
maintain anonymity. First, collectors and investors may keep their
identity private by using shell corporations to purchase art.138
Second, in addition to providing lower transaction costs, freeports
also allow investors to store their works confidentially.139 A recent
example of a transaction revealed by the Panama Papers
demonstrates the usefulness of these layering techniques for money
launderers. In 2012, Phillipe Maestracci, the grandson of a Jewish
art dealer, sued the Nahmad Gallery for the return of a painting by
Amedeo Modigliani titled Seated Man with a Cane that he alleged
the Nazis stole from his grandfather.140 The Nahmad family
asserted that they did not have the painting and Christie’s records
showed that an offshore corporation registered in Panama, called
International Art Center, purchased it in 1996 at an auction.141 In
2016, the release of the Panama Papers revealed that the Nahmad
family is actually the sole shareholder of International Art
Center.142 Maestracci was not able to link the Nahmad family to
the International Art Center previously because there were multiple
layers of anonymity between the two.143 First, the International Art
Center was incorporated in Panama, a secrecy jurisdiction that
renders the discovery of beneficial ownership of a shell
136
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Id.; see also Superseding Indictment, supra note 133, at 16–17.
138
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139
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corporation impracticable.144 Second, the Nahmad family stored
the works confidentially in a freeport.145 Thus, while the Nahmad
family did not launder money through the purchase of the
Modigliani painting, this case demonstrates how an individual can
purchase a work of art without leaving any trace of her identity.146
3. Speculative Pricing
The lack of price transparency for artwork is also attractive to
money launderers.147 Art’s intangible aspects make it difficult,
especially for investors who are new to the market, to value.148
Trends and personal tastes often affect the price of a work.149
Buyers are interested in new artists who will be “the next big
thing” in the market as well as those artists who have already

144

Id.
Id.
146
Another interesting example of anonymity in the art market is the use of third-party
guarantors in auctions. Lawrence M. Kaye & Howard N. Spiegler, The Art Market:
Would More Regulation Spoil All the Fun?, HERRICK (Oct. 2016), http://
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THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/07
/panama-papers-joe-lewis-offshore-art-world-picasso-christies [https://perma.cc/Q4JDNDLT].
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achieved recognition in their respective periods.150 Furthermore,
the price of a work of art may be dependent on its aesthetic or
sentimental value to particular collectors.151 How rare or unique a
work of art is will also influence its price.152 These intangible
values can be difficult for those who are not art experts to
quantify.153 Furthermore, there is currently no “standardized art
valuation methodology” or “quantitative analysis” to determine the
fair market value of a piece of artwork.154
This uncertainty surrounding art’s valuation allows a money
launderer to manipulate the price of a work of art,155 which is
advantageous to a criminal scheme for several reasons. First, it
allows a money launderer to import or export a work of art across
borders without detection.156 Through “trade-based money
laundering” a criminal can transfer the value gained from an illicit
crime by moving an asset such as art out of one country and into
another.157 Because U.S. customs law does not require
documentation of merchandise worth less than $200, a criminal
can avoid customs detection by stating a work’s value as less than
that amount.158 Additionally, customs officials are not art experts,
and therefore, do not have the knowledge base to question the
stated price of a work.159 Thus, a launderer can purchase a work of

150
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155
Lopez, supra note 154.
156
Shea, supra note 15, at 674.
157
Purkey, supra note 7, at 126.
158
Cohen, supra note 53.
159
Purkey, supra note 7, at 126.
151
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art worth millions of dollars, and transport it into the United States
by stating it is worth only $100 without raising suspicion.160
Second, launderers can manipulate the price of a work at
purchase or sale.161 For example, a launderer might inflate the
acquisition price of a piece to launder more money through it162 or
sell a work at an inflated price.163 Due to the somewhat subjective
nature of art, innocent purchasers and authorities would be hardpressed to determine whether a purchaser has overpaid.164 One
recent example of a dispute between a buyer and a seller
demonstrates the difficulty of identifying price manipulation, and
how a money launderer might enlist a professional art intermediary
to help her to do so. In October 2018, a billionaire art collector,
Dmitry Rybolovlev brought suit against Sotheby’s in New York
for aiding Yves Bouvier, a Swiss art dealer, in defrauding him
through the sale of several works of art.165 Rybolovlev previously
brought suit against Bouvier, who purchased the works for lower
values than he disclosed, and then sold them to Rybolovlev at an
inflated price.166 For example, Bouvier sold Rybolovlev one piece,
by Modigliani, for $118,000,000, despite having previously
purchased it for only $93,500,000 from a private collector.167 In his
suit against Sotheby’s, Rybolovlev claimed that the auction house
“knowingly and intentionally bolstered the plaintiffs’ ‘trust and
confidence in Bouvier and rendered the whole edifice of fraud
plausible and credible’ by brokering certain sales and inflated
160
Shea, supra note 15, at 674 (providing as an example a Brazilian banker’s import of
a Jean-Michel Basquiat painting entitled Hannibal worth $8,000,000 by listing the price
of the work as $100).
161
Lopez, supra note 154; The Art Market and Money Laundering: A Symposium, CASE
WESTERN RESERVE U. SCH. LAW (Oct. 12, 2018), https://law.case.edu/LecturesEvents/EventId/386/e/the-art-market-and-money-laundering-a-symposium-12-oct-2018
[https://perma.cc/7DNL-Q5AC].
162
See, e.g., DELOITTE, supra note 29, at 3.
163
See Steiner, supra note 100, at 363 (describing money laundering opportunities in
the Swiss freeports); see also CASE WESTERN RESERVE U. SCH. LAW, supra note 161.
164
Steiner, supra note 100, at 364; Lopez, supra note 154.
165
Margaret Carrigan, Russian Billionaire Rybolovlev Sues Sotheby’s for $380m in
Fraud Damages, ART NEWSPAPER (Oct. 3, 2018, 20:38 GMT), https://
www.theartnewspaper.com/news/russian-billionaire-rybolovlev-sues-sotheby-s-forusd380m-in-fraud-damages [https://perma.cc/T3EF-Z79K].
166
Id.
167
Steiner, supra note 100, at 363–64.
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valuations.”168 While Bouvier did not launder money through this
sale, the transaction demonstrates the lack of price transparency in
the sale of art, which exists as a tool for money launderers.
II. REGULATION VERSUS PRACTICE: IMPOSING ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING LEGISLATION ON THE MODERN ART MARKET
While the vulnerability of the art market makes clear the need
for measures to prevent money laundering, the implementation of
regulatory burdens presents a substantial conflict between the
government’s and market operators’ interests. Section II.A
provides an overview of a recent proposal for specific legislation to
target money laundering in the art market. Section II.B describes
the art market’s criticisms of the bill and regulation in the art
market in general. Section II.C examines similar conflicts arising
from the application of BSA regulations to real estate and precious
metals dealers.
A. The Illicit Art and Antiquities Trafficking Prevention Act
A recent proposal for legislation would implement the first
regulations to directly target money laundering through art.169 On
May 18, 2018, Congressman Luke Messer introduced an
amendment to the BSA, the Illicit Art and Antiquities Trafficking
Prevention Act (the “Illicit Art Act”), that would add “dealers in
art or antiquities” to the list of financial institutions under the
BSA.170 Thus, in addition to reporting cash transactions over
$10,000, professional art intermediaries would also be responsible
for at a minimum “(i) the development of internal policies,
procedures and controls; (ii) the designation of a compliance
officer; (iii) an ongoing employee training program; and (iv) an
independent audit function to test [programs].”171 Additionally,
dealers, as financial institutions, would also likely have to file
168

Carrigan, supra note 165.
Kinsella, supra note 65.
170
Illicit Art and Antiquities Trafficking Prevention Act, H.R. 5886, 115th Cong.
(2018). The Illicit Art Act lapsed at the end of December, and needs a new sponsor as
Congressman Messer lost his seat in the midterm elections. Carrigan, supra note 147.
However, the bill may be re-introduced in 2019. Id.
171
Boles, supra note 8, at 493.
169
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Suspicious Activity Reports with FinCEN.172 The specific
regulations that FinCEN enforces in the art market under the
authority of the act would likely be similar to those for dealers in
precious metals, stones, and jewels.173 For example, the art market
has speculated that the regulations would apply to dealers in art or
antiquities who purchase more than $50,000 in covered goods and
receive the same amount in gross proceeds from the sale of
artwork each year.174
Congressman Messer has stated the purpose of the Illicit Art
Act is to “reduce international money laundering and crack down
on terrorist organizations like ISIS.”175 The amendment would
specifically target the pervasive anonymity in art market
transactions, by creating strong incentives for dealers to prevent
money laundering.176 Art dealers would have to take the same
compliance measures as other “financial institutions” under the
BSA, and the financial consequences of non-compliance with the
BSA can be quite large.177 Thus, the regulatory burdens would
theoretically prevent dealers and auction houses from turning a
blind eye to money laundering, and encourage them to join
investigators and prosecutors in helping to detect it.

172

See id. at 483. FinCEN did not impose the requirement of suspicious activities
reports on dealers in precious metals, stones, and jewels. See Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Dealers in Precious Metals,
Stones, or Jewels, 70 Fed. Reg. 33702 (proposed June 9, 2005) (codified at 31 C.F.R. §
103).
173
CULT. PROP. NEWS, supra note 20 (citing 31 C.F.R. § 1027.100 (2018)).
174
Id.
175
Id. According to the Washington Post, estimates of how much money ISIS had made
from the sale of looted antiquities range from $4,000,000 to $7,000,000,000. Fiona RoseGreenland, How Much Money Has ISIS Made Selling Antiquities? More than Enough to
Fund Its Attacks, WASH. POST (June 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/posteverything/wp/2016/06/03/how-much-money-has-isis-made-selling-antiquitiesmore-than-enough-to-fund-its-attacks/?utm_ter [https://perma.cc/68CF-TZQM].
176
Kinsella, supra note 65. “The new law would zero in on the beating heart of the art
market: the financial relationship between dealers and their clients….” Id. (quoting
Thomas C. Danziger, of Danziger, Danziger & Muro) (internal quotations omitted).
177
For example, FinCen charged B.A.K. Precious Metals, Inc. $200,000 in regulatory
fines for failing to adopt compliance measures under the BSA. FinCen Assesses Money
Penalty Against Precious Metals Dealer for Violations of Anti-Money Laundering Law,
FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.fincen.gov
/sites/default/files/news_release/20151230.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8QQ-2XNR].
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B. A Dealer’s Perspective: Opposing Regulation of the Art
Market and the Illicit Art Act
Organizations representing professional art intermediaries have
opposed regulations in the art market, including the Illicit Art Act,
for several reasons.178 First, dealers are concerned that regulations
would hinder positive relationships with clients who value their
privacy. Second, small businesses in the art market are worried
about the costs of compliance with the BSA. Finally, pushback
from the art market reflects the sentiment that art’s inherent value
and speculative pricing should exempt it from regulation as a
commodity.
1. Privacy in Transactions
While the pervasive anonymity in the art market allows money
launderers to hide their identities, it also has several legitimate
benefits to collectors and investors. For example, a collector may
want to avoid the embarrassment of public inquiry if she is selling
her artwork because of a financial rut.179 Collectors may also
generally want to prevent “industry gossip” pertaining to their sale
of a work.180 Additionally, a valuable work becomes vulnerable to
theft if it is sold to a collector whose name is publicly disclosed
and left in the collector’s home.181 Anonymous transactions and
confidential storage spaces such as freeports allow individuals to
protect their expensive collections from theft.182 As explained
above, a savvy investor might also utilize the secrecy of a freeport
to add value to a work by keeping it out of the public eye, and later
re-introducing it to the market as a “fresh work.”183 Ultimately, art
dealers may choose not to reveal their clients’ information to third

178

See, e.g., Letter from Clinton R. Howell, President, CINOA, to Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman, Fin. Servs. Comm., https://culturalpropertynews.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/05/letter-from-CINOA.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7TC-AZ4G] (raising the three
concerns listed in this paragraph, as well as casting doubt on the claim that art and
antiquities are used to launder funds for terrorism).
179
Steiner, supra note 100, at 357–58.
180
Shea, supra note 15, at 679–80.
181
Steiner, supra note 100, at 358.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 359.
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parties or keep records of their transactions,184 because these
practices are beneficial to collectors and investors, not because
they are trying to promote criminal activity.185
In light of the above considerations, the possibility that the
application of the BSA to the art industry might require extensive
investigations by dealers into their clients’ backgrounds and
identities poses a serious conflict.186 The development of internal
policies and procedures under the BSA might require dealers to
verify the identity of their clients or investigate their
backgrounds.187 Furthermore, an independent audit would force a
dealer to give a third-party auditor access to the information the
dealer does gain about her client.188 According to international art
confederation CINOA, requiring clients to provide identifying
information would actually deter them from purchasing artwork.189
Many dealers are also worried that information provided to the
government could lead to government searches of private
collections.190 Consequently, while the Illicit Art Act targets the
use of anonymity for criminal gains, it may also have a negative
effect on clients’ legitimate privacy interests.
2. Regulatory Burdens on Small Businesses
The compliance burdens of an anti-money laundering program
under the BSA have two potential negative effects on the art
industry. First, as the ADAA has argued, small businesses may not
be able to incur the costs of regulatory burdens.191 As Joe Laird of
184

Shea, supra note 15, at 671–72.
See Letter from Clinton R. Howell, President, CINOA, to Jeb Hensarling, Chairman,
Fin. Servs. Comm., supra note 178.
186
See CULT. PROP. NEWS, supra note 20.
187
See, e.g., Kevin L. Shepherd, The USA PATRIOT Act: The Complexities of Imposing
Anti-Money Laundering Obligations on the Real Estate Industry, 39 REAL PROP., PROB.
& TR. J. 403, 424 (explaining the potential application of the same standards to lawyers in
real estate dealings).
188
See id. at 425 (explaining the potential application of the same standards to lawyers
in real estate dealings).
189
Letter from Clinton R. Howell, President, CINOA, to Jeb Hensarling, Chairman,
Fin. Servs. Comm., supra note 178.
190
CULT. PROP. NEWS, supra note 20.
191
Anna Louie Sussman, Galleries Could Face “Unnecessary and Onerous”
Regulation Under New Legislation, ARTSY (May 24, 2018, 12:38 PM), https://
185
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Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP notes, dealers “‘come in all
shapes and sizes . . . . They can be large galleries with a number of
different locations, or they can be literally someone in Kansas
working out of their apartment.’”192 The implementation of an antimoney laundering program under the BSA might be entirely
feasible for large auction houses which appear already to have
similar programs in place.193 Yet, compliance under the BSA can
cost from $2000 to $5000 for small businesses each year.194
Accordingly, art and antiquities dealers have argued that
compliance costs would be quite burdensome for small businesses
who do not have the same “infrastructures or resources” as the
major auction houses.195 Second, the imposition of compliance
burdens could deter individual collectors from expanding their
collections. As art and cultural heritage attorney Leila
Amineddoleh explains, there are many individuals who collect art
for their own enjoyment—as opposed to professional dealers
whose objective is to make a profit from the purchase and quick
sale of art—but still trade in millions of dollars of art each year.196
With extensive regulation, those individual collectors who are not
willing to adopt anti-money laundering programs may turn to
collecting other luxury assets instead, thereby impairing the art
industry as a whole.
3. The Character of Art
Another concern with proposed regulation of the art market is
the treatment of art as a commodity. According to this view, the
government should not regulate art in the same way it regulates
financial commodities197 because art has cultural and other
www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-galleries-face-unnecessary-onerous-regulation-newlegislation [https://perma.cc/N8XD-QNWE].
192
Id. (quoting Laird).
193
See supra Section I.C.2; see also Kinsella, supra note 65 (citing Michael
McCullough, previously associate counsel at Sotheby’s).
194
CULT. PROP. NEWS, supra note 20.
195
Sussman, supra note 191; Small, supra note 21.
196
Small, supra note 54 (quoting Leila Amineddoleh).
197
“A commodity is a basic good used in commerce that is interchangeable with other
commodities
of
the
same
type.”
Commodity,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commodity.asp [https://perma.cc/SB5Y-AAM8] (last
updated Apr. 23, 2018).
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intangible values, and no set value.198 For example, determining
the price of a jewel involves a quantitative evaluation of its cut,
clarity, and color.199 In contrast, as explained above, an evaluation
of the price of a piece of art involves substantial qualitative
evaluation of the history of the work, current market trends,
inherent cultural and aesthetic values, and how rare the piece is.200
Furthermore, there is no standardized valuation methodology for
determining the price of a piece of art.201 Thus, because art is not a
commodity, art market operators have argued that it should not be
subject to the same regulations as commodity goods.202
C. Similar BSA Conflicts in Other Markets
In considering how to apply regulations to the art market, it is
helpful to examine the application of the BSA to other financial
markets. The imposition of the BSA on real estate and precious
metals dealers presented similar conflicts of client confidentiality
and financial burdens. This Section describes the relevant conflicts
and several proposals for or final resolutions of them.
1. The BSA and Real Estate Dealers
After the enactment of the PATRIOT Act, FinCEN attempted
to craft regulations for “persons involved in real estate closings and
settlements”—essentially all real estate dealers—which are part of
the BSA’s definition of financial institutions.203 As this definition
was somewhat broad and ambiguous,204 FinCEN temporarily
198

Small, supra note 54.
See, e.g., Gem Price Guide, INT’L GEM SOC’Y, https://www.gemsociety.org
/article/gem-pricing-guide-sample [https://perma.cc/PQ9T-V9L9] (last visited Dec. 7,
2018).
200
See supra Section I.D.3.
201
See supra Section I.D.3.
202
Small, supra note 21.
203
Shepherd, supra note 187, at 406. Congress added real estate dealers to the
definition of “financial institutions” in 1988. Id. at 407.
204
Id. at 414–15 (explaining that “‘[t]he universe of participants in real estate
transactions is potentially broad, even in the simplest residential real estate transaction.’
In all real estate closings and settlements, the participants include the buyer and the seller.
Beyond those two core participants, the participants in a real estate closing and settlement
may include the real estate agent or broker; the mortgage lender; the mortgage banker;
the appraiser; the surveyor; the title insurance company; the respective lawyers for the
199
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exempted this group from BSA compliance in 2002 to consider its
specific characteristics before implementing regulations.205
FinCEN has yet to promulgate final regulations for real estate
dealers, but in 2003 it issued an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking for relevant market operators to comment on what the
regulations should look like.206 Several market operators responded
to the invitation for comment, noting in particular the difficulty
lawyers involved in real estate transactions would face in
complying with BSA reporting requirements while maintaining
attorney-client confidentiality.207 Under the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility, “[a] fundamental principle in the
client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client’s
informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating
to the representation . . . .This contributes to the trust that is the
hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.”208 Thus, the imposition
of BSA compliance, requiring that an attorney investigate her
clients’ background and allow for an independent auditor to review
this information,209 would not be compatible with these goals.210
The investigation into the client’s background alone would create a
problematic “adversarial relationship” between the attorney and
her client, while revelation of information to a third party would
violate the duty of confidentiality.211 Market operators were also
concerned that the regulations would impose significant burdens
on real estate dealers who do not engage in many transactions.212
The comment letters included several suggestions for how
FinCEN might tailor regulations in the real estate market to avoid
confidentiality conflicts and onerous compliance burdens.213 Three
buyer, seller, and lender; an escrow agent; the environmental consultant; the pest
inspector; and the building inspector or engineer. Thus, a real estate closing and
settlement may involve over a dozen participants.” (alteration in original)).
205
See Boles, supra note 8, at 493–94.
206
Shepherd, supra note 187, at 410.
207
Id. at 421.
208
Id. at 423 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2018)).
209
See supra Section I.B.1.
210
See Shepherd, supra note 187, at 424–25.
211
See id. at 424–25.
212
See id. at 421.
213
See id. at 428–32.
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are particularly relevant. First, the Real Property Section of the
Florida Bar (“Florida Real Property Section”) suggested that to
protect the lawyer-client relationship, attorneys should be
exempted entirely from anti-money laundering regulations.214
Second, to prevent overburdening real estate dealers, the Mortgage
Bankers Association of America (“MBAA”) proposed a safe
harbor for persons involved in real estate closings “if they contract
with other financial institutions to collect or verify customer
identification.”215 Similarly, the American Land Title Association
(“ALTA”) suggested that FinCEN exempt transactions such as
residential mortgage loan refinances, which have a low risk of
money laundering.216
2. The BSA and Precious Metals Dealers
The definition of “financial institutions” under the BSA also
includes “a dealer in precious metals, stones, or jewels.”217 In
2002, FinCEN deferred application of anti-money laundering
requirements to precious metals dealers to examine the industry.218
In response to FinCEN’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
businesses selling precious metals pointed out that imposition of
regulations in this industry presented substantial compliance
burdens.219 In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FinCEN
addressed the fact that businesses that purchase precious metals
from other dealers are less vulnerable to money laundering because

214

See id. at 430 (citing Letter from Louis B. Guttmann, Chair-Elect, Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar, to FinCEN I n.1 (June 9, 2003),
http://www.fincen.gov/guttmann.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q65T-JBGC]).
215
See id. at 431 (citing Letter from Stephen A. Bromberg, President, American
College of Mortgage Attorneys, to FinCEN 1 (June 6, 2003), http://www.fincen.gov
/bromberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/LPZ3-GG38]).
216
See id. at 432 (citing Letter from Ann vom Eigen, Legislative and Regulatory
Counsel, American Land Title Association ("ALTA"), to FinCEN 1, 4 (June 5, 2003),
http://www.fincen.gov/vomeigen.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN4Z-B2XQ]).
217
Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(N) (2012).
218
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for
Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 68 Fed. Reg. 8480, 8481 (proposed Feb.
21, 2003) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103).
219
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for
Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 70 Fed. Reg. 33702, 33711 (proposed June
9, 2005) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
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to “abuse [the] industry, a money launderer must be able to sell as
well as purchase” precious metals.220 Thus, “there is substantially
less risk that a retailer who purchases goods exclusively or almost
exclusively from dealers” that are already subject to anti-money
laundering requirements under the regulations would “be abused
by money launderers.”221 For this reason, in its interim final rule
FinCEN largely exempted retailers from regulation under the
BSA.222 Thus, the definition of dealers who must establish money
laundering programs excludes those retailers who “during the prior
calendar or tax year, purchased more than $50,000 in covered
goods from persons other than dealers or other retailers.”223
FinCEN also addressed the burden presented by the requirement of
independent auditing.224 In its Interim Final Rule, FinCEN allowed
precious metals dealers to utilize their own employees—as
opposed to an unaffiliated service provider—to accomplish the
BSA’s audit requirement, as long as the employee is not the
designated compliance officer or otherwise involved in the
business’s anti-money laundering program.225
III. A PROPOSAL FOR PREVENTING MONEY LAUNDERING
IN THE MODERN ART MARKET
The art market’s vulnerability to money laundering and lack of
incentive for professional intermediaries to help prevent it makes
government oversight necessary. This Part proposes several key
elements of a regulatory framework in the art market as well as
suggestions for the art market to adopt more standardized
practices. Section III.A argues for nuanced regulation in the art
market, which takes into consideration the legitimate concerns of
professional art intermediaries. Section III.B suggests changes
from within the art market to prevent money laundering.
220
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for
Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8482.
221
Id.
222
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for
Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 70 Fed. Reg. at 33717.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 33711.
225
See id.
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A. Regulating the Modern Art Market
Regulations imposed on the art market should improve rather
than stifle professional art intermediaries’ relationships with
collectors and investors. If Congress were to apply the BSA to
dealers in art or antiquities, FinCEN would have the task of
interpreting the regulations for the art industry, with the authority
to consider “the extent to which the requirements imposed . . . are
commensurate with [dealers’] size, location, and activities . . . .”226
This Section presents several solutions for tailoring regulations—
whether for the Illicit Art Act or other legislation—so that they aid
professional art intermediaries in conducting anti-money
laundering investigations without disrupting the art market. It also
suggests implementing regulation outside the art market to directly
target criminal use of shell corporations.
1. Addressing Compliance and Privacy Concerns
To prevent overburdening small art dealers and galleries, any
regulation in the art market should apply only to professional art
intermediaries who are particularly vulnerable to money
laundering risks. Money launderers tend to favor high-priced
pieces to move large amounts of illicit cash.227 Thus, similar to
low-risk residential mortgage loan refinances, lesser value works
likely do not pose as high of a money laundering risk as high-value
works do, and galleries that only sell low-value works or only a
few high-value works each year should not have to bear the costs
of compliance.228 Therefore, regulations in the art market should
exempt transactions involving works of art with low monetary
values.229 For example, in interpreting the definition of “dealers in
226

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
352(c), 115 Stat. 272, 322.
227
DELOITTE, supra note 29, at 3.
228
Shepherd, supra note 187, at 432 (citing Letter from Ann vom Eigen, Legislative
and Regulatory Counsel, American Land Title Association ("ALTA"), to FinCEN 1, 4
(June 5, 2003), http://www.fincen.gov/vomeigen.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN4Z-B2XQ]).
229
The European Union recently adopted anti-money laundering regulations for the art
market in its Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive. Eileen Kinsella, Art Dealers Push
Back Against the European Union’s New Money Laundering Regulations, ARTNET NEWS
(Apr. 30, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/european-union-tightens-art-market-
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art or antiquities,” under the definition of “financial institutions” in
the BSA, dealers should be defined as only those trading in, “[x]
number or more works above [x] price per year.”230 Thus, the
regulation would target the most vulnerable transactions, without
stifling small dealers’ businesses.
Burdens would also be lessened if regulations applied only to
professional art intermediaries engaged in the purchase and sale of
art as businesses, not to individual collectors and investors. As
explained above, there are wealthy collectors who purchase and
sell high-value artworks, but are not engaged as professional
intermediaries.231 Imposing compliance burdens on many of these
individuals in addition to dealers, would be unnecessarily
duplicative where they are purchasing most of their works through
professional intermediaries, such as dealers and auction houses,
who are already covered under regulations. It would also hurt the
art industry because collectors forced to establish anti-money
laundering systems might stop purchasing art altogether and search
for other luxury items to collect instead.232 Thus, similar to the
precious metals retailers who purchase mainly from precious
metals dealers, the potential for money laundering abuse is low in
transactions between art collectors and art dealers who would
already have anti-money laundering systems in place under the

oversight-1275338 [https://perma.cc/7K5G-DS9Z]. The regulations require dealers to
verify the identity of clients who purchase a work for more than 10,000 euros. Id. In
reaction to this threshold, CINOA commented that “far too many art and antiques market
transactions would be caught by the measures.” Id.
230
See, e.g., Loi fédérale sur la mise en oeuvre des recommandations du Groupe
d’action financière, révisés en 2012 [Federal Law on the Implementation of the Financial
Action Task Force Recommendations, Revised in 2012] Dec. 12, 2014, FF 9465, 9476,
arts. 129 (2014) (Switz.), available at https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/2014
/9465.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3LS-L9Q3] [hereinafter Loi fédérale]. Recently enacted
Swiss regulations preventing money laundering in freeports pertain specifically to
transactions exceeding 100,000 CHF (about $100,000), rather than the gross profit of the
intermediary. Steiner, supra note 100, at 365–66. Ascertainment of the prices posing the
most substantial risk of money laundering requires further investigation beyond the scope
of this Note.
231
Small, supra note 54 (quoting Leila Amineddoleh).
232
See supra Section II.B.2.
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regulation of the art industry.233 Thus, regulations should exempt
collectors who purchase only a very small portion of their work
from sellers, other than covered art dealers, or auction houses. For
example, in the application of the BSA, those collectors who
purchase less than a certain amount of their art from sellers other
than “dealers” should be excluded from the definition of “dealers.”
234
Thus, even if a collector would fit in the definition of
“dealers”—those professional intermediaries who sell x amount of
x-priced paintings per year—she would be exempted if most of her
purchases were from other “dealers.”235
Finally, to protect art clients’ privacy concerns, regulations
imposed on the art market should allow a client to maintain
confidentiality for legitimate reasons in transactions. Clients’
privacy concerns center on their fear of public inquiry about the
sale and the protection of their collections from theft. Thus,
requiring that an art dealer investigate a client’s background and
expose client information to a third-party auditor may be a concern
for many collectors. One way to assuage this concern would be to
allow art dealers to conduct independent audits through one of
their employees, rather than an outside auditor, similar to
FinCEN’s Interim Final Rule for precious metals dealers.236
Alternatively, the regulations might assuage client concerns by
giving them a choice of whom to reveal their information to.
Unlike attorneys who breach their duty of confidentiality to their
clients if they share their confidential information with anyone,237
art dealers may be able to share client information with certain
groups without deterring clients from purchasing art. Similar to the

233
See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for
Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 68 Fed. Reg. 8480, 8482 (proposed Feb.
21, 2003) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103).
234
See id.
235
See id.
236
See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Anti-Money Laundering Programs for
Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones, or Jewels, 70 Fed. Reg. 33702, 33711 (proposed June
9, 2005) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
237
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”).
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MBAA suggestion that real estate dealers should be exempt if they
contract with another financial institution to collect or verify
customer identification, regulations of art dealers could exempt
transactions involving a financial intermediary such as a credit
card company.238 For example, regulations for art dealers under the
BSA could include a safe harbor from identification and due
diligence for those transactions involving a financial intermediary
such as a bank.239 If a client were concerned about “industry
gossip” for example, she might choose to conduct the transaction
through a bank rather than providing extensive background
information to the art dealer and auditor. The transaction would
still be monitored for money laundering risk because the bank
would have its own systems in place to verify it.240
2. Targeting Shell Corporations
As the Nahmad case demonstrates, money launderers can take
advantage of beneficial ownership to hide their identities in the
purchase and sale of art.241 The use of shell corporations to hide
beneficial ownership in transactions creates money laundering
risks not only in the art industry but also in other industries such as
real estate.242 Thus, the United States should directly target the lack
of transparency in beneficial ownership across all industries.243
One solution is the Incorporation Transparency and Law
Enforcement Assistance Act (the “Incorporation Transparency
Act”),244 proposed in 2017, which would require that U.S.
companies disclose their beneficial ownership to the

238
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241
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App. Div. 2017).
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See id. at 505–06.
244
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government.245 The legislation would task the Treasury
Department with creating guidelines for the registration of a
corporation including “(i) identification of beneficial owners by
name, current address, and non-expired passport or state-issued
driver’s license; (ii) identification of any affiliated legal entity that
will exercise control over the incorporated entity; and (iii)
consistent updating of lists of beneficial owners no later than 60
days after any change in ownership.”246
The Incorporation Transparency Act would target anti-money
laundering risk without disrupting art dealers’ practices because it
would prevent the use of beneficial ownership for illegitimate aims
in all markets, not just the art market. Furthermore, it would only
require that corporations disclose their owners to the government,
not that clients disclose their identity to professional art
intermediaries or the public.247 For example, if the Incorporation
Transparency Act were to pass, then theoretically an individual
who wanted to obtain beneficial ownership information would
have to ask the court to require the government to reveal it.
Nevertheless, in such a case where the plaintiff can demonstrate
evidence of her need for such information in discovery, it would
not be impossible to trace the ownership. Thus, an art client could
utilize a shell corporation to purchase art, while keeping the
transaction private from the art-buying public for legitimate
reasons; however, if the government had evidence that the use of a
shell corporation was actually for laundering purposes, it could
trace the beneficial ownership to prevent further abuse.
B. Self-Regulation: Enforcing Professional Standards Within the
Art Market
While legislation directly targeted at money laundering through
art is essential to aiding law enforcement in identifying the crime,
the art market itself should also begin to develop its own standards
to protect legitimate dealers and clients. Self-regulation in the art
245

See id. at 497.
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market is equally important, because it would enable uniform
standards of professional practice in the industry and enforcement
of such standards from experts who best understand its unique
characteristics. This kind of standardization is essential,
particularly in a market that is rapidly expanding and inviting new
types of clients.
One suggestion that reflects the changing character of the art
market towards investment is the creation of a regulatory agency
similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission.248 This “Art
Exchange Commission” would enlist existing art organizations and
art lawyers to create standard policies and best practices by dealers
and auction houses.249 The commission could also create greater
transparency by granting licenses to dealers and auction houses
based on their practices or creating a rating system for
businesses.250 Legislation might eventually enable such a
commission to legally enforce its standards in the art market.251 An
Art Exchange Commission, with regulatory authority, might be a
nuanced approach to creating greater transparency in the art market
because the enforcement would come from dealers and art lawyers
who understand and appreciate the importance of its unique
characteristics.
The U.S. art market might also move towards requiring
licensing for professional art intermediaries with an organization
like the ADAA.252 Smaller organizations like the ADAA who
enforce professional standards in the art industry are not
particularly effective in combatting money laundering because
they do not have standards specifically addressing this crime, and
even if they were to adopt money laundering guidelines, dealers
are not required to join these organizations or adhere to such
standards.253 Because of a rapidly expanding art market, and the
248
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threat of money laundering, as well as numerous other criminal
schemes, art dealers should move towards standardized practices
that are enforceable across the market.254 Additionally, these
practices should supplement anti-money laundering regulations,
rather than merely duplicate them. Thus, in addition to ethical
guidelines requiring that dealers comply with all relevant laws,255
an organization could also adopt mandatory educational courses
that teach dealers what red flags to look out for and how to comply
with anti-money laundering regulations. Efforts from within the
industry to combat practices that enable money laundering would
be beneficial as they would come from individuals with knowledge
of an art business’s operations. Furthermore, these guidelines
would actually be enforceable if dealers were required to join such
an organization in order to practice.
CONCLUSION
The high-end art market is increasingly becoming an area of
financial gain, rather than simply intellectual and cultural value.
Yet, as investors flock to the art world and open doors to new
investment opportunities, money launderers also enter with
nefarious ends. The unique culture of privacy and lack of any
incentive to report suspicious transactions allows launderers to
access art’s value without detection and while most art dealers are
honest traders, those such as Green who take advantage of their
unique positions, have little to fear with regards to detection.
Without any oversight from the market itself, stringent anti-money
laundering programs are necessary so that dealers have adequate
incentive to aid law enforcement in detecting illicit schemes.
see also, e.g., Guidelines on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing,
RESPONSIBLE ART MKT, http://responsibleartmarket.org/guidelines/guidelines-oncombatting-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing
[https://perma.cc/CV9D-YBU4]
(last visited Dec. 7, 2018). Several global organizations, such as Responsible Art Market
have attempted to create standards in the art market that are similar to BSA anti-money
laundering compliance measures. Id.
254
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venture into that marketplace.”).
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Targeting money laundering through art is important not only
to identify and punish criminals for their underlying crimes, but
also to prevent their abuse of art. Criminals who use art to launder
money view works as mere vessels for cleansing illicit gains, 256
thus disposing of a work’s aesthetic, cultural, and educational
values. Philip Rivkin’s scheme, in particular, reflects this reduction
of art’s value to merely monetary. Rivkin hid of millions of
dollars-worth of famous photographs and made no attempt to
prevent the United States from seizing them likely because it was
not financially beneficial to him to do so.257
To prevent this abuse without disrupting the culture of the art
market and legitimate dealers’ practices, legislators and regulators
must pay careful attention to market operators concerns. In crafting
regulations for the art market, they should respect legitimate
reasons for privacy, and avoid burdening dealers who have very
little vulnerability to money laundering schemes. The art market,
in the face of increasingly high prices and globalization, should
also begin to develop more standardized practices and
enforcement. Thus, with greater oversight and standard
professional practices, the art market can aid law enforcement in
preventing money laundering through art.
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